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By focussing on the logical relations between scientific theories and religious beliefs in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011), Alvin Plantinga overlooks the real conflict between science and religion. This conflict exists whenever religious believers endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning the supernatural. They thereby violate an important rule (r) of scientific method and of common sense, according to which (seriously disputed) factual claims should be endorsed as (approximately, probably, etc.) true only if they result from validated epistemic methods or sources.

Textualism or Originalism, as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In philosophy, Textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In theology, Textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and historical scholarship. I argue that Textualism is the only valid methodology of interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation and application of statutes and constitutions, however, Textualism cannot be more than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of Textualism in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated version of Textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called doctrine of the Living Constitution is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice Scalia's simple version of Textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid methodology of judicial interpretation.

Textualism or Originalism, as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In philosophy, Textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In theology, Textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and historical scholarship. I argue that Textualism is the only valid methodology of interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation and application of statutes and constitutions, however, Textualism cannot be more than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of Textualism in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated version of Textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called doctrine of the Living Constitution is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice Scalia's simple version of Textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid methodology of judicial interpretation.

The arts and sciences evolve by specialisation and broadening of their scopes. Much innovation results from unusual combinations of views and techniques originating in widely different domains. However, stepping outside an established discipline entails the danger of 'shallowness', even if the primary challenge was a 'deep' integration problem. Acceptance of new departures requires recognition and understanding of what is involved, and this depends, among other things, on the adopted nomenclature of the insiders and the resulting perception by outsiders.Thus, current ways of referring to varieties of research and study - say, 'sciences' vs 'humanities' - often form obstacles to the appreciation of novel approaches. New views are necessary. But which angles must be considered? - Ter gelegenheid van haar 250-jarig bestaan organiseerde de Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen (opgericht in 1752) in 2001 een Prijsvraag met als onderwerp The Future of the Sciences and Humanities. Deelnemers werd gevraagd hun licht te laten schijnen over de toekomst van de Wetenschap, vooral vanwege de steeds verdere verbreding en wederzijdse overlap van de meest uiteenlopende disciplines. Vier inzendingen werden bekroond: de bijdragen van James McAllister, Johan van Benthem, Arie Rip en Herman Philipse vormen de basis voor een kritisch debat over de toekomst van het interdisciplinair onderzoek. Onder de titel The Future of the Sciences and Humanities brengt Amsterdam University Press in mei 2002 een prachtige jubileum-uitgave uit voor de Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen waarin de vier bekroonde essays en een samenvatting van het debat gebundeld zijn. De uitgave staat onder redactie van P.A.J. Tindemans, A.A. Verrijn-Stuart en R.P.W. Visser.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Contributors -- 1. Introduction:Transcendental Heidegger -- 2. Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice: -- 3. Heidegger on Kant on Transcendence -- 4. Conscience and Reason: Heidegger and the Grounds of Intentionality -- 5. Transcendental Truth and the Truth That Prevails -- 6. The Descent of the Logos: -- 7. Letting Be -- 8. Heidegger and the Synthetic A Priori -- 9. Heidegger's Topology of Being -- 10. Heidegger's Transcendental Phenomenology in the Light of Husserl's Project of First Philosophy -- 11. The "I Think" and the For-the-Sake-of-Which -- 12. Heidegger's "Scandal of Philosophy": -- 13. Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of What Isn't: -- 14. Projection and Purposiveness: -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index